This article develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the role of state-level policies towards the dairy sector in the presence of farmland amenity benefits, and applies it to Connecticut. Milk supply, demand and amenity benefit functions are estimated, and three exogenously determined milk prices are considered.
Introduction
Population amenity benefits, policy, dairy, land use, open space. and economic growth in many regions of the world have resulted in the conversion of significant amounts of agricultural land to urban uses.
The remaining farmland often yields nonmarketed environmental amenity benefits such as those accruing from scenic landscape and open space. Many governments seek to encourage and support agriculture with programs for farmers based on sustaining the food production capability of a region, maintaining family farms and income levels, and preserving cultural identity (Fishel 1982; Plaut 1980; Moore 1990) . From an economic perspective, however, another justification for government intervention is the failure of the land market to fully consider environmental amenity benefits from agriculture (BtidSky, Workman and Williams 1986; Bergstrom, Diilman and Stoll, 1985; Halstead 1984; Gardner 1977; Lapping and Forster 1982; Young and Allen 1986) . In the case where dairy farms yield nonrnarketed amenity benefits, there may be justification for the government to intervene and support the dairy industry.
Land in dairy often represents a significant portion of agricultural land in urbanizing areas. For example, in Connecticut, which is a densely populated state with a high per capita income, 37 percent of the total land in farms is in dairy (USDA, 199 1) . Furthermore, the amount of land linked to dairy exceeds 50 percent of total farmland when the acreage of field corn and hay used to feed dairy cows is included (Waggoner, 1986) . In spite of the State's efforts, land in dairy continues to decline in Connecticut (Andersen and Mali a, 1991;  This article has two objectives. The first is to develop a conceptual model for analyzing the role of public policy in the presence of amenity benefits from land in dairy.
The second is to provide an empirical framework for determining the socially optimal size of a regional dairy industry and the welfare implications of alternative government policies. Using Connecticut as a casestudy, the analysis considers three state-level support policies which focus on milk production and, at the same time, indirectly influence the amount of land in dairy and associated amenity benefits.
The Conceptual Model
It is widely recognized that farmland yields nonmarketed amenity benefits in densely populated regions (Foster, Halstcad, and Stevens, 1982; Bergstrom, Dillman, and Stoll, 1985) . Let AB denote the value of nonmarketed amenity benefits, net of any negative externalities often associated with agricultural production such as water pollution and odors. Because of the public-good character of amenity benefits associated with land in dairy farms, it is reasonable to assume that AB will increase as population (POP ) increases.
As with any other normal good, these amenity benefits can also be expected to increase as the amount of farmland (L) increases and as income of the region (z) increases. Mathematically, the foregoing can be expressed as
where the derivatives h, >0, hP<l,,>0 and h,>O. Following the empirical evidence in Brookshire, Randall, and Stoll (1980) , and Lopez, Shah and Altobello ( 1994) , it is assumed that h[,,, < 0, which means that there is diminishing marginal utility with respect to open space.
Let the total quantity (Q) of milk produced in the region be expressed as Q = y.L, where y is "yield" of milk per unit of land. Using this expression and holding population, income, and yield constant (at pop~, ] J and y~~,respectively ),' amenity benefits can be expressed as
The marginal amenity benefits ( MAB ) with respect to milk production can be derived from (2) as
MAB = i3AB/i?Q = ,~Since hi,, <0, it follows
That is, marginal that 8MAB18 Q = ,fqq < 0. ' amenity benefits decrease as milk production Increases, cetcris paribus.
Let the region in question be a small producer of milk which competes in a relatively large market and assume a downward sloping demand for milk within the region. If no imports or exports of milk were allowed, and there were no government price controls, market equilibrium would occur where the region's demand curve intersects the supply curve as given by the industry's marginal cost (MC) curve, However, since the region under consideration is relatively small, one may assume that the price of milk is determined outside the region. This exogenously determined price of milk is termed "reference price"
and is denoted by p r.
Assume that the objective is to maximize net social benefits (NSB ) to the region which are defined as net private benefits plus amenity benefits from the regional production of milk.' The social planner's problem is to select Q in order to
where C(Q) is total cost of milk production for the region, Assuming an interior solution, the flrstorder condition for maximizing N~~is given by
aQ (4) That is, the socially optimal quantity Q q is obtained when the marginal cost of production equals the exogenously determined market price plus the marginal amenity benefits. Since land in dairy yields amenity benefits and MC does not reflect the true social costs of milk production, following standard procedure (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 1982) , the marginal social cost ( &fsc) for milk production is obtained by subtracting the marginal amenity benefits (as given by MAB ) from the MC equation. In other words, equation (4) says that
P"=MSC(Q*)
The situation for a region importing milk is illustrated in Figure 1 . If amenity benefits are not considered, equilibrium occurs where the industry marginal cost of production curve intersects the supply curve at market price p~and production level Q r. If amenity benefits are fully considered, equilibrium occurs where the marginal social cost of production equals p r at a production level given by Q* The socially optimal production level Q* is greater than Q' which is the level of production which maximizes net private benefits in the absence of government intervention. This implies that, by ignoring amenity benefits from local milk production, the market underallocates the amount of land area that should be devoted to dairy farms since L* =Q*lYI>LI =QtlyO
The regional welfare gains from fully considering the farmland amenity benefits are illustrated in Figure 1 . The increase in production costs from attaining the optimal level of milk production is given by~b Q* Q'. The increase in amenity benefits is given by abc~, and the increase in milk production would bring additional milk sales of p~(Q * _ Q I). Hence, the net welfare gain to the producing region is given by the shaded areaacd (additional sales plus additional amenity benefits minus additional production costs),
In the case of relatively small milk producing regions, market distortions, such as those introduced through Federal support prices, marketing orders and foreign trade barriers, are to be taken as given and are reflected in the actual milk price received by producers.
Under these conditions, the welfare maximizing strategy in (3) will utilize the actual price, p (I, as the reference price.
For purposes of comparison, two other reference prices which represent different degrees of regulation are considered:
a price under minimal marketing order regulation with only the Federal support price in place, denoted as pm, and a world price for milk, p w. This exercise reflects the ongoing discussions of policy reform occurring at the national and international levels concerning deregulation of the milk market.
However, since these two additional reference prices are only applicable if the relevant policy scenarios occur exogenously, no attempt should be made to make normative comparisons, such as those regarding social welfare levels, across reference prices.
Model Estimation
This section illustrates how the above conceptual model can be implemented to ascertain the optimal size of the Connecticut dairy sector in the presence of amenity benefits. More specifically, the objective of this section is to estimate marginal cost (&fc), marginal amenity benefits (MAB) and demand (D) functions for milk in Connecticut.
All of these functions are assumed to be log-linear in their parameters.
Given inflexibilities in the short run, due to asset fixity, technological constraints, and time required to adjust production choices in dairy (Quirogd and Bravo-Ureta, 1992) , it seems reasonable to develop an analysis of partial adjustment behavior.
Let an empirical model for milk production be expressed as lnQ~=ao+allnp, +~a2, wi, +e,,
where ]n is the natural log operator, Q,d is the desired level of milk output in period c , p, is the price of milk, w,, is a vector containing the price of inputs, as are parameters; and e, is a random disturbance. Following Gujarati (1988) , the partial adjustment model is given by ln Q, -h Q,., = A.(lnQ~-In Q,_l), where A is the degree of partial adjustment and OSXS1.
Substituting for in Q,d above, the observed level of milk production Q, is given by: 
where p . Xct, and p! = kc,. All data for estimating the parameters m (6) were collected for the 1960-90 period from USDA Agricultural Statistics.
The input vector consisted of the agricultural wage rate (WI), a feed price index (w,) ' and a price index for energy ( W2).
Observations on WZ and W3 were expressed as indexes whose values were set equal to 1 for 1990.
The regression results for equation (6) 
To estimate the amenity benefit function, we use the relationship expressed in ( 1) and let the empirical form of this function be:
where e and the~s are the parameters to be estimated and other notation is as previously defined.4 Estimates of total willingness-to-pay to prevent moderate levels of development on agricultural land are used to measure AB, and were obtained from Foster, Halstead, and Stevens (1982) for three Massachusetts communities and from Beasley, Workman, and Williams (1986) for a community located in the Matanuska-Susitna Valley outside Anchorage, Alaska.
These studies were chosen because they used very similar surveys and because all four communities represent rapidly urbanizing areas with similar per capita incomes, where the loss of farmland is a concern.
Values for farmland were also taken from these studies, while population and income data were collected from the City and County Data Book. All monetary values were expressed in 1990 dollars.
The estimated amenity benefits function is given by:
These results show that amenity benefits are an increasing function of farmland, population, and income, and are consistent with our modeling assumptions regarding AB in the previous sections Substituting Q/y for L, the margina] amenity benefits accruing from milk production are given by: k4AB =. Equation (I I) was applied to the case of the Connecticut dairy sector in the following manner. First milk yield was estimated from the 1987 Census of Agr-icul~ure for Connecticut by dividing milk production by land in dairy. This resulted in a value of y" equal to 3,679 pounds per acre.
Second, pop 'I was set equal to the nonurban population in the state (686,000) since this group is more likely to enjoy dairy farmland amenity benefits on a regular basis relative to the remaining population.
Third,~' was taken as the 1990 per capita income for that segment of the population ($18,71 6).' Using these values of y", (1 1) gives:
POPC)~and 11) in
Finally, a demand curve (D) for Connecticut was derived by utilizing observed price and quantity data and an elasticity of demand of -0.26 (Haidacher, Blaylock, and Myers, 1988 one which equates the relevant reference price with marginal cost of production (MC) and another one which equates that price with the marginal social cost
MSC. (MC -~AB),
The values of MAB and MC are derived from (8) and ( 12). The results and policy implications are presented below.
Empirical Results
The results the three scenarios, in Table 1 show that in each of when p I =MSC, the optimal amount of land in dairy exceeds" that which 'would occur when only MC is considered. Also, the milk production level is higher when amenity benefits are taken into account.
More specifically, under the actual situation, the optimal amount of land in dairy is estimated to be 31 percent higher than when land allocation is Iefi to market forces. The additional amount of land devoted to dairy farms increases milk production and thus lowers import requirements.
Under minimal marketing order regulation and world price, the increases in land are, respectively, 42 percent and 58 percent higher than in the allocation which ignores amenity benefits. Note that the percent change in land is higher the lower the reference price, primarily due to higher marginal amenity benefits stemming from lower dairy acreages.
Also note that land in dairy is estimated to be 1 percent lower under the world price with amenity benefits than under the actual situation without considering amenity benefits.
Lopez, Altohello and Shah: Amenily Benefi[s and Public Policy
The regional welfare implications of the three scenarios are outlined in Table 1 . In all three cases, a comparison of the optimal solution (P', Q*) with the corresponding market situation ( P', Q I) shows increased production costs (area abQ*Q' ) in amounts ranging from $21.74 million> using world price, to $24.71 million in the actual situation. Increases in amenity benefits (area~bcd) also occur and these range from $9.55 million under world price to nearly $6 million in the actual situation. Finally, milk sales also increase (area acQ* Q I) with gains of $22 million accruing In the actual situation, about $20 million under p "I, and $17.7 million occurring under the world price. The result of al} of the changes noted above is a net welfare gain (area Udc ) in all three scenarios.
To assess the impacts of exogenous variables on the allocation of resources in dairy, simulations were conducted where the milk reference price, wage rate, population, and income variables were increased by onc percent in order to obtain elasticity coefficients.
The results are Table 2 . A one percent increase in the impact of a onc percent increase in income on each of the three values for p ) results in increases optimal quantity produced and land in dairy is of 0,65-0.83 percent in the optimal level of milk moderate, the impact on NSB is substantial (6.91-production and land devoted to dairy (since milk 7.30 percent increase). Thus, the potential yield is assumed constant). The resulting change in NSB contribution of public policy toward improving is only 1.25-1.43 percent lower than the resource allocation in the face of amenity benefits is corresponding results presented in Table 1 . The particularly strong in the more affluent areas.
main consequence from an increase in the agricultural wage rate is a reduction in the optimal Policy Implications and Conclusions size of the dairy industry, while the main consequence from increases in population is Within the context of our analysis, we moderately increased net social benefits, Although consider three possible state-level policy programs Table 2 . Sensitivity Analysis for the Connecticut Dairy Sector. Lopez, Aliobello and Shah: Amenity Benefits and Public Policy for attaining the socially desirable level of milk production, and hence, land in dairy: a price subsidy, a two-tier pricing scheme, and a production cost subsidy. In principle, all three lead to the same aggregate social welfare, although they have quite different distributional consequences, as reported in Table 1 .
First consider the case of a producer price subsidy.
If a subsidy per cwt (equivalent to the value of MAB at Q*) was added to p I in each of the three scenarios, this would yield p*, the price at which the desired level of production would be obtained. The cost to the taxpayers is estimated at MAB x Q * and is nearly equivalent in each of the three cases: $22.67, $22.13, and $21.67 million, respectively. Next consider the use of a two-tier pricing scheme, where subsidies equal to the value of M,4B at Q* are paid only for each additional unit of milk beyond Q~(and up to Q*). The cost of such a program is considerably lower than in the previous case and ranges from $5.37 million in the actual situation to $6.55 million under minimal marketing order regulation to nearly $8 million under the world price.
Finally, a production cost subsidy program would entail payments to cover the net extra costs of expanding production from Q I to Q*. The extra cost of expanding production is given by area abQ* Q I in Figure 1 . However, part of these costs can be covered by the additional milk sales (area acQ *Q' ). Hence, the minimum subsidy rewired to expand production is given by area abc. The cost of this policy would be slightly lower than that of the two-tier pricing scheme and would range from $2.71 million in the actual situation to $3.31 million under minimal marketing order regulation to $4.04 million under world price. Hence, a production cost subsidy promises to be the most cost-effective option of the three programs considered.
Considering the distributional consequences of the alternative policy programs, milk producers would prefer a price support program which subsidizes all production.
From the taxpayers' viewpoint, the production cost subsidy program would be preferable in view of the much higher costs associated with programs which subsidize the price of all or part of total regional milk production. From an implementation standpoint, objections to the production cost subsidy or two-tier pricing scheme can center on the administrative complexities of such programs.
The adoption of these systems might be facilitated if complemented with producer quotas (Hubbard, 1992 ). An interesting modification of the use of quotas is to vest producers with the right to market Q* _ Q' and let them trade their assigned quotas which qualify for the subsidy.
In addition, the above programs might employ certain elements from the Federal setaside programs for grain crops (USDA, 1990), such as making payments conditional upon land use. Note however that in the Federal set aside programs, the goal is to take land out of production, but in the case at hand the objective is to expand acreage due to positive externalities.
Hence, payments to milk producers under any of the three programs mentioned above could be made conditional upon keeping land in dairy.
In summary, farmland in urbanizing regions often provides important amenity benefits that are not taken into account by agricultural commodity markets.
This dual role of farmland, both in providing market goods and nonmarketed amenity benefits, can result in underallocation of land to agriculture if left to market forces.
This article presents a simple model that accounts for farmland amenity benefits with the objective of analyzing the effects of alternative policy scenarios. An empirical illustration is provided using the Connecticut dairy sector.
The empirical tindings show that the amenity benefits increase with farmland, population, and income. Simulation results indicate that land is underallocated to dairy in Connecticut, a relatively affluent and densely populated state. Although alternative policy programs can, in principle, attain the socially desirable level of production and land in dairy, they have quite different distributional consequences.
Subsidizing the price of all or part of total regional production would entail relatively large transfers of income from taxpayers to producers.
However, a production cost subsidy, which applies only to the additional production up to the socially desirable level, seems to be a costeffective and reasonable alternative if supplemented with tradeable quotas, and if payments are conditional upon keeping land in dairy.
An important limitation of the analysis is the assumption of constant output/land ratio used in the specification of the amenity benefit function. Technological breakthroughs and the adoption of alternative management techniques could dramatically change this ratio and, hence, the results and policy implications.
Also, it should be noted that the empirical procedures in this article are for illustrative purposes only. Ideally, data for estimating the amenity benefit function should be collected for a specific study area in order to make accurate site-specific policy recommendations.
The dual role of farmland in providing amenity benefits and agricultural commodities is likely to gain importance in the future as urban pressure on farmland increases.
This article highlights the importance of quantifying and including amenity benefits in public decision making concerning the agricultural sector, Although it represents a first step in that direction, the agenda is wide open for extending the model. For example, Gardner (1994) advocates including considerations of land use dynamics, spatial heterogeneity, and political economy in models of this type. Extension of the analysis in any of these dimensions should prove fruitful.
